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This article focuses on the issue of equality of elections, in the context 
each person with the active voting right the same number of votes. The material 
aspect of the equality principle is connected with striving to guarantee the same 
number of people elect as many representatives as another group with the same 
numerical strength.
The main aim of this article is focus on the material aspect of imple-
menting the principle of equality in EP elections. In the article will be em-
(electoral districts, election threshold and electoral formula), at the same time 
formulate conclusions about the degree to which the European Parliament 
election conducted in Poland on 25th May 2014 met the principle of material 
equality.
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Introduction
Equality is a positive value in democratic regimes. When it is empha-
sized, the aim is to show that the members of a certain community are treated 
in the same way regarding their freedoms, rights and responsibilities. So equal 
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treatment of everybody, regardless of sociodemographic differences between 
people, is the goal to which the rulers should strive in political systems consid-
ered to meet the requirements of democracy.
The essence of equality discussed on the political ground comes down to 
-
erences of another one [Dahl, Lindblom 1953: 41]. Hence, the attempts to create 
an institutional system which will guarantee each citizen an identical opportunity 
to participate in taking political decisions and controlling the decisions taken by 
the authorities are completely understandable. Taking into consideration the fact 
that the contemporary democracy is predominantly representative, the institution 
of elections is of key importance, especially regarding the way they are organized 
-
ing decisions on who will exercise the authority and as a consequence, whose and 
what kind of political programme will be chosen for implementation by particu-
lar public authority bodies1 [Wojtasik 2012: 54-77; Wojtasik 2013: 25-38].
Elections are organized at various levels. The highest systemic and social 
2011: 209]. By means of such elections, the citizens of a given country decide 
about the personal composition of the parliament (or at least one of the cham-
bers in the case of bi-cameral parliaments). In many countries, it is becoming 
more and more popular to leave the issue of appointing the head of the country 
in different countries the institution of general elections is used as a way of cre-
ating still other national authorities (e.g. the election of the Prime Minister in 
Israel), which in turn proves the endemic character of many systemic solutions.
The processes of decentralization of power have led to the development 
of different forms of territorial self-government and/or territorial autonomy 
-
sequence, the citizens of certain selfgovernmental communities or autonomic 
-
cal and regional level.
th century, 
all the way through the 20th -
cerning different areas of their existence, has been more and more obvious. 
One of its expressions in Europe is integration processes, with their institution-
al manifestation of the European Union, already including almost thirty states. 
The formation of supranational European structures resulted in the creation of 
1
in the case of European Parliament elections [Hix 2010: 123; Wojtasik 2012: 300], although 
the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty leads to the reconsideration of some conclusions.
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many bodies making a complicated institutional system of the EU [Hix 2010: 
The term “parliament” is of key importance, especially that we cannot 
imagine the existence of any democratic political system without a parliament 
elected directly by the sovereign [Antoszewski, Herbut 2001: 237]. At the EU 
level, the parliament of course does not play such a role and does not serve the 
functions that national parliaments do, but since it is composed of “representa-
2 [ ..., Article 14.2], it is 
-
ve, the history of the European Parliament, which started in 19623, can be divi-
 until 1979, its composition 
depended on the decisions made by the parliaments of the member states, hen-
ce it appeared to be an inter-parliamentary body. The beginning of the second 
[2005: 12], thanks to that, this body really became a “supranational institution”. 
have been participating in elections to a supranational body, apart from natio-
nal, local and regional elections [Dalton, Scarrow, Cain 2004: 126-127].
in it (citizens who exercise their active and passive voting rights and political 
parties) to adapt to the new conditions, which especially in the countries of the 
transformation processes. Second, the subjects responsible for creating the ru-
les of the electoral game should aim at creating an electoral system that would 
guarantee the recognition of European Parliament elections not only as free but 
also as fair elections.
This article focuses on the issue of equality of elections, in the context of 
the 2014 European Parliament election. The very concept of equality of elections 
2
the European Union” [Election Code..., Article 330]. 
3 The emergence of the European Parliament should be analysed from the processual 
perspective. True, a body called “the European Parliament” appeared in 1962, but even 
with the contemporary European Parliament (with different names whose evolution was 
connected with the dynamics of integration processes) [Dydak 2003: 11-12].
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person with the active voting right the same number of votes. This essentially 
means a demand to create mechanisms which prevent any group of people from 
having a higher number of votes because of the value of property they own, be-
longing to a certain social class, education level or other characteristics used to 
the equality principle is connected with striving to guarantee the same “voting 
of people elect as many representatives as another group with the same numeri-
cal strength [Glajcar, Okrzesik, Wojtasik 2006: 14]. This, so to say, rudimentary 
approach to the electoral equality principle is currently being extended, and in 
-
ciple. This is proved for example by identifying the third aspect of the discussed 
principle apart from the formal and material ones, referred to as the equality of 
aspects is connected with a growing number of elements which determine its 
-
times broadened4. The aim of this article, however, is not to carry out conceptual 
-
pirical data, which will allow to formulate conclusions about the degree to which 
the European Parliament election conducted in Poland on 25th May 2014 met the 
principle of material equality. Obviously, absolute compliance with the principle 
is very unlikely in a dynamic social system, but getting possibly close to the ideal 
will allow us to assume that the said principle has been accomplished.
Assuming that legal norms are the framework within which the election 
participants should operate, it is worth making a few comments on the norma-
tive character of European Parliament elections. In Europe, the regulations are 
general in character, and detailed issues are decided by the legal acts of each 
-
en the voting systems applied in individual member states. As part of the analy-
sis, it is worth noticing that it was determined at the level of primary European 
Union law that European Parliament elections should only be general and direct, 
4
election equality: “... it is becoming necessary to analyse not only its fundamental element, 
meaning whether voters are entitled to an equal number of votes, but also their other rights 
differentiation of rights of individual voters may appear”. 
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and the ballot should be free and secret [ ..., Article 
Decision of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 amending the Act concerning 
the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct univer-
sal suffrage [2002] it was provided that in each Member State, members of the 
European Parliament shall be elected on the basis of proportional representa-
tion, using the list system or the single transferable vote (STV).
It is easy to notice, then, that no declaration concerning equality of elec-
tions was included in the above regulations. It is not surprising, especially that 
the distribution of seats between the member states where they are later allocated 
The data in Table 1 show the difference in the voting power between voters in 
particular EU member states. Of course we also need to remember that the pre-
sented data only indicate what Jerzy Jaskiernia [1992: 23] calls “potential voting 
power” in contrast to the “actual voting power” . This distinction is worth highli-
ghting not only because of the importance of the turnout aspect for the evaluation 
of material vote equality but also because the citizens of the European Union can 
participate in elections of MEPs on the territory of each EU member state, not 
only the one of which they are citizens. The use of this opportunity, then, may 
-
ble. However, taking into consideration for example the Polish experience from 
2009 [Glajcar 2010: 57], this phenomenon may be regarded as marginal, not af-
There are 503.6 million citizens in the European Union. Taking into 
account the fact that in 2014, 751 European Parliament representatives were 
elected, there is one representative to almost 670,600 citizens (the norm of re-
presentation). The fourth column of Table 1 shows the disproportions of the 
voting power among citizens of the member states. We can see that the vote of 
So, noticeably, deviations from the material aspect of equality are considerable. 
The votes of citizens of demographically smallest member states of the EU are 
the most powerful. And conversely, the votes of largest states have the lowest 
power. It is connected with the adopted principle of degressive proportionality, 
unfavourable for the citizens of EU largest states. In addition, apart from the de-
mographic potential, the smallest states are guaranteed the minimum number of 
seats (six), thus consciously violating the proportional pattern of seat distribu-
tion. The fact that this clause contradicts equality is beyond doubt. It is enough 
to disregard the smallest member states (Malta, Luxembourg, Cyprus, Estonia) 
Slovenia is much lower (the votes of the latter are “only” 3.5 times stronger).
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The general character of the European legal norms concerning European 
Parliament elections resulted in the necessity to regulate the principles of elec-
toral competition at the level of national law. What is interesting, in Poland one 
of the principles of election law regarding European Parliament elections is 
equality [Election Code..., Article 328]. Remarkably, this principle did not ap-
ply in the elections of 2004 and 2009. So the decision included in the Election 
Code is a novelty, changing the essential aspect of the European Parliament 
election system valid in the territory of the Republic of Poland. Since 2014, 
the elections should be conducted in a way which guarantees the implementa-
tion not only of the formal but also the material aspect of equality. Therefore, 
present in the election of 25th May 2014. Actually, not only the code require-
and this undermines the fundamental goal of free elections: appointing the re-
Another argument for seeking the mechanisms that guarantee the implemen-
tation of election equality principle (even in the situation it is not part of the 
constitutional or statutory catalogue of election law principles) refers to Polish 
electoral tradition, in which it is deeply rooted [Michalak 2010: 13].
Analysis
The issue of the material aspect of equality of elections is closely related 
to the necessity to analyse the selected elements of the electoral system. The 
-
condly, as a consequence of that, it may promote equal representation but may 
also violate it, favouring certain parts of the country or territorial communities. 
-
retain the , while other political actors will strive to change it. 
Regarding European Parliament elections, Poland has been divided 
into thirteen districts. Seven of them cover the areas of single voivodeships 
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district no. 4 (including the capital city of Warsaw) and district no. 5. Thus the 
hybrid model of determining electoral districts was applied. Basically, the au-
thors of the solution referred to the administrative division into voivodeships, 
but they also used the possibility to combine them, which indicates a distinct 
(in a way, non-administrative) way of creating electoral districts. The applied 
mechanism provides the basis for the formulation of twofold observations. 
-
sult in objections concerning consciously combining or dividing voivodeships 
by the parties which have the parliamentary majority in order to maximize the 
voivodeships constituting districts together with territorial division units which 
have a higher number of voters may distort their sense of justice concerning the 
implementation of the traditional model of territorial representation [Michalak 
2010: 13]. Besides, we must not ignore the important aspect that members of 
the European Parliament formally represent the whole collective subject of so-
vereignty, and in this sense the division into electoral districts may be treated as 
a technical procedure. Remembering this, we need to emphasize the occurrence 
dimension on the one hand, and the national one on the other. 
The adopted division shows that the potential mean size of a district (3.92) 
is low. It is the result of a relatively low total number of seats to be distributed 
(51). This was one of the reasons for the interesting proposal of creating only 
one electoral district covering the area of Poland, presented during the works 
-
ver, it was not approved. Still, when adopting the system of thirteen electoral 
the number of the seats a district receives does not depend either on the number 
of citizens of the territory or the number of people entitled to vote. This results 
the candidates from the district lists of each election committee are aggregated 
at the national level. On the basis of outcomes determined this way, the seats are 
distributed among the entitled election committees (that is why some authors 
claim that we  have one electoral district covering the whole country 
[Antoszewski, Herbut 2006: 327]). After the number of seats of each committee 
is determined, they are distributed among the district lists of candidates.
Thus the number of seats for each electoral district indirectly depends 
on the turnout level within the district. Higher turnout in a district increases the 
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probability that particular committees will achieve better outcomes in this di-
strict than their lists achieved in other districts, and as a consequence, will be 
decisive for the allocation of a higher number of seats in this district. This is 
turnout (35.33%) was observed in district no. 4 (as compared to 23.83% at the 
-
tly more than the potential value calculated for this district, amounting to sli-
ghtly above 3.6. Analogously, we cannot disregard the fact that the most unfa-
vourable ratio of the potential size of electoral district to the actual number of 
seats was observed in district no. 3, where the election turnout was the lowest. 
It was the only district where the turnout did not exceed the 20% threshold. 
Hence, we must conclude that seeking correlations between a high electoral 
turnout and the actual seize of the electoral district is fully legitimate. At the 
same time, as post-election data indicate, this relation is by no means absolu-
te. Not always does a high turnout guarantee the increase of the district pool of 
district no. 6 the turnout level was similar to the national one (23.72%). It was 
Voivodeship the second highest negative ratio of actual versus potential district 
size was observed (-1.389). At the same time, in district no. 5, where the turnout 
level was one of the lowest (20.08%), this ratio was “only” -0.364 (Table 2.).
-
toral district is not absolutely dependent on the election turnout. Hence, there 
must be another element ultimately decisive for the distribution of seats among 
the districts. Actually, it is the district distribution of support concerning indi-
vidual election committees. It is worth checking, then, to what extent it affects 
the size of particular electoral districts and how the “dynamic”, not “stable”, 
aspect of equality of the European Parliament election in Poland in 2014.
 It is indisputable that the mechanism of creating the electoral district 
size in European Parliament elections applied in Poland is more dependent 
on the distribution of support among district lists of a certain election com-
(Table 3). The only election committee which obtained seats in all the thirteen 
). It is a con-
sequence of relatively even distribution of support among the district lists of 
the lowest. The winner of the European Parliament election in 2014, Platforma 
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), obtained seats in twelve of the districts. 
Lubelskie Voivodeship (district no. 8) was the only one where PO did not re-
from that district (2.86% of all the votes cast on that party in the election), even 
more clearly seen against the background of support for the party in the other 
support was the highest.
committees is even better shown by the level of extreme deviation from the 
mean result of district lists determined for each of them. This way we can com-
the given district against the background of the all-Poland result. The district 
it was a little higher, 9%. The medians for both parties are also similar in both 
cases: 7.02% and 7.32% respectively. But the fundamental difference occurred 
in extreme deviations from these values, which were 6% for PO (the highest 
among the parties which received seats) and 4.69% for PiS. This index best 
shows that the votes cast for PO, which had the greatest support in the election 
of 25th May 2014, were distributed more unevenly than in the case of Prawo 
and PO, “only” in twelve.
In the case of the other parties, the level of extreme deviation was also 
varied. The lowest value of the index was observed for Koalicyjny Komitet 
Democratic 
Nowa Prawica ( ) of Janusz 
( , 5.75%. Due to the relatively low number of seats ob-
tained by these three committees at the national level, none of the district lists 
distribution of seats was determined by the value of the rest, which means that 
the seats fell to those district lists which achieved the highest support, in the 
and in the case of Nowa Prawica and PSL, four lists each).
which directly affects the size of the electoral district is the distribution of sup-
port among the districts for the election committee which accomplished the elec-
tion threshold at the national level. The factor which acts in favour of increas-
ing the size may be high election turnout, especially if its level is considerably 
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higher than in the other districts. However, it is not an absolute relation, since 
the votes in such a district may be distributed proportionally among the lists of 
comparison with the results of the committee in the other districts. Another ele-
-
toral district is concentration of support for parties not exceeding the national 
election threshold. This issue is discussed in greater detail further in the article.
At this stage of the analysis, we need to conclude that the adopted way 
of determining the size of electoral districts in European Parliament elections in 
the Republic of Poland does not guarantee the implementation of the material 
material equality, signalled in the previous sentence, results from the fact that no 
the violation of the material equality principle. On the basis of “
”: I.2.2.4] we can only assume that the number of 
voters per seat within a given district should not be higher or lower than 10% 
(in special cases, 15%) of the computed electoral quota, indicating the number 
of voters per seat on average in the scale of the whole country. Yet, in the anal-
ysed election, the deviations were much greater (Table 2.). Votes cast in district 
no. 3 had the lowest power. In this case, the deviation from the norm of represen-
tation at the national level was almost 76%. The opposite extreme was district 
no. 4, where the votes proved to be by over one fourth stronger than the national 
standard. If we were to compute mean deviations, for the districts in which the 
-
higher than the norm of representation computed at the national level (eight dis-
tricts), the mean deviation was slightly over 11%. These data show that the lev-
els of acceptable deviations provided in the “Code of Good Practice in Electoral 
-
jective, but it is impossible to ignore the fact that in the case of four districts the 
described deviations are within the 0-10% range suggested by the Code, in other 
obviously violated (this concerned approx. 1/3 of persons entitled to vote).
Therefore, it is proper to think whether as part of electoral engineering 
-
mentation of the material aspect of equality. It seems that understanding the 
-
tention must be focused on the question of representation model [more: see . 
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Szymanek 2005: 223-236; Szymanek 2013: 1-22]. The basic problem is that 
the assumptions of who a Member of the European Parliament represents are 
fact that from the point of view of election outcome determination (in the po-
litical party dimension) Poland is actually one electoral district, a seat of a rep-
resentative receives the general national character or is connected with repre-
senting the citizens of a member state of the EU5
repartition of seats among the district lists determines the way of conducting 
-
ed in the binding ballot mode (technique) and it often also affects the voting 
at the district level. These are the premises to recognize that a special bond is 
created between the representative and the voters, which may be cemented by 
the territorial aspect of representation at the expense of its national character. 
This dual nature of representation, created as a result of electoral engineering, 
has a negative impact on the observance of the material aspect of equality of 
European Parliament elections. In the face of the fact that the goal of elections 
conducted on the territory of a state where over thirty million citizens have the 
-
one electoral district covering the area of the Republic of Poland. It would al-
accurately as possible. But was/is this the aim of the political actors deciding of 
the adoption of solutions within the framework of the binding electoral system?
It is worth mentioning another of its elements, namely the election thresh-
old. This issue is even more interesting as in the election of 25th May 2014 near-
ly 900 thousand votes were cast for candidates of the committees which did not 
of all valid votes, so approximately every eighth voter decided to support a party 
Of course the basic issue is why a certain solution is introduced to the set 
of rules regulating the electoral competition. In the case of the election threshold, 
the wish to avoid excessive fragmentation of the political representation body 
of the links of a longer representation chain, e.g. when its political composi-
tion is of key importance for the formation and operation of the government 
5
strategy used by the election committees of some parties, which involves placing a candidate 
“from outside” on the district list, not connected in any way with the particular territory. 
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(parliamentary regimes). But does this argumentation correspond to the functions 
and role of the European Parliament in the EU institutional system? While with 
reference to the previous terms the answer would be clearly negative, the 2014 
of Lisbon of 13 December 2007, which came into force on 1 December 2009. 
Among other things, it introduced changes in creative powers of the European 
Parliament [Galster, Knade-Plaskacz 2010: 194-195], including those concern-
ing the European Commission, referred to as the “main executive body of the 
EU” [Hix 2010: 35]. It concerns the president of the Commission, who had been 
nominated by the Council of the European Union before, then approved by the 
of the Commission by the EU Council. The Lisbon Treaty changed this proce-
Council presents a candidate for the position of the European Commission presi-
dent to the European Parliament. Pursuant to Article 17 section 7 of the Treaty 
on European Union, it does so “taking into account the elections to the European 
Parliament and after having held the appropriate consultations ...”. Second, the 
indicated candidate is elected by the European Parliament by a majority of its 
members. Thus, the new procedural solution can be perceived as tackling the 
In the present legal state, the European Parliament was entrusted with the elec-
tion of the president of the European Commission, which means authority broad-
er than just “approving”. However, it does not change the fact that the only body 
at the European level being the result of general and direct elections still cannot 
present its “own candidate” but takes a decision as to the nominee previously 
indicated by the European Council. What is even more important in the context 
of European Parliament elections, when indicating the candidate the European 
Council must “take into account the elections to the European Parliament”. 
-
-
ration of the European Parliament as a consequence of its democratic election 
of the European Commission. It does not mean that the current solutions are clos-
er to those known from national parliamentary or premier-presidential regimes. 
After all, the institutional system of the EU is formed on a different basis. Still, 
the outlined procedure indicates the increasing importance of the results of the 
European Parliament elections in the context of creating the European executive.
Having written these short comments, let us return to the issue of election 
-
old in European Parliament elections. It has been established at the maximum 
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possible level of 5% of valid votes in the whole country. The above-mentioned 
changes introduced with the Lisbon Treaty caused an increase of importance of 
the European Parliament election results for the election of the president of the 
the legitimacy of emphasizing the effectiveness of ruling rather than represen-
tative character of the representative body. This would justify the introduction 
of elements limiting the probability of political fragmentation of the electoral 
system. In this situation, however, it is important to differentiate between the 
national level of political competition from the European one so as to under-
stand that the basic phase of the elections, connected with voters expressing their 
preferences and then with the transformation of votes into seats, is not necessar-
6
electoral campaign is conducted at the level of member states, and the voters 
cast their votes for lists presented by national political parties or their coalitions. 
Thus they express their approval of particular ideological and policy options but 
political parties acting on the national political scene and supranational political 
groups operating in the European Parliament must be taken into consideration. 
-
tion decision. Especially in the situation when the level of institutionalization of 
political parties is relatively low, it cannot be excluded that the choice of a frac-
[Wiszniowski 2008: 271, 273]. So we cannot say that the results of European 
Parliament elections in individual member states aggregated at the European 
of supranational political groups functioning within this body. Thus, the elec-
tion threshold applied at the level of the national electoral system is not directly 
translated into the level of political fragmentation of the European Parliament.
The applied election threshold might also be perceived from the per-
spective of protection of national interests at the level of an important European 
authority. It would mean aiming at the formation of mechanisms to guarantee 
that the pool of seats allocated to Poland will be distributed among the parties 
which will constitute real powers within the framework of supranational politi-
cal groups in the European Parliament. Such argumentation seems legitimate, 
especially in the situation of a multi-party system in an extremely pluralized 
version. However, when the multipartyism is only moderate, the strength of 
such arguments is lower.
6
which decided that the introduction of the election threshold in European Parliament elections 
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-
ers. Yet, we may think to what extent it affects the distribution of seats among 
the subjects participating in elections. We need to remember that the power of 
the election threshold depends not only on the level at which it is applied (na-
tional or district) or its height (expressed in per cent or determined by calculating 
the electoral quota) but also on the situation context, particularly on the num-
ber of subjects taking part in the electoral competition and their social support, 
as well as on whether and to what degree voters use tactics in casting their votes. 
-
tion of votes between the election committees, disregarding the election thresh-
old. It is not surprising that in the latter case the number of subjects receiving the 
seats (10%). PO and PiS would lose two seats each, and PSL would receive one 
level of 3-4% (Table 4.), and the natural threshold7, when treating Poland as one 
electoral district (the distribution of seats at the national level) would be lower 
than 2%. It proves, then, that the election threshold does not radically change the 
contest. So Arend Lijphart is right when he writes that “District magnitudes and 
electoral thresholds can be seen as two sides of the same coin: the  barrier 
against small parties imposed by a threshold has essentially the same function 
as the barrier implied by district magnitude” [Lijphart 1999: 153].
It is also worth analysing whether (and if so, to what extent) the elec-
-
ity. In literature of the subject a negative correlation between a high value of 
election threshold and the implementation of material equality of elections is 
work demand considerable conservatism in formulating such conclusions 
would cause a change in the size of only four out of the thirteen districts (dis-
tricts no. 4, 7, 11 and 12). At the same time, 11,742,792 persons had the right 
to vote in these districts, so the changes would affect over 38% of voters regis-
tered in Poland. Second, in two districts the voting power would increase (dis-
tricts no. 4 and 11), and in two other, it would decrease (districts no. 7 and 12). 
Third, in the case of three districts the deviation from the national norm of rep-
resentation would increase, and in one, the voting power would approximate it. 
7 The natural threshold calculated from the formula proposed by Arend Lijphart [1999: 153].
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-
tion of the voting power of voters from different districts. The maximum devia-
tions from the electoral quota, indicating how many voters there are per seat in 
the whole country on average would be almost 39% in the district where all the 
voters would have the strongest vote (as compared to less than 27% when tak-
ing into account the election threshold) and almost 76% in the district with the 
lowest voting power (this value would not change). As for the mean deviation 
for the districts where the voting power proved to be lower, it would be slightly 
which the voting power would prove to be higher than the norm of representa-
tion computed at the national level, the mean deviation would oscillate around 
15% (compared to 11% with the election threshold).
The above calculations show that the application of election threshold 
does not have to cause a fundamental disturbance of the implementation of the 
-
mote the decrease of disproportion in the voting power among voters from differ-
ent districts. In the analysed case, it turned out that from the perspective of mate-
rial equality of elections the size of electoral districts is more important than the 
election threshold. Also, giving up the constant size of districts in favour of their 
dynamic shaping undoubtedly increases the importance of the election threshold 
for the implementation of material equality of elections. It is so because the ex-
clusive character of the election threshold, eliminating weaker parties from seat 
effect of the support distribution. As this analysis has showed, it may cause both 
increase and decrease of the size of electoral districts. The conclusion is, there-
fore, that in the situation when the size of the electoral district is determined at the 
stage of transformation of votes into seats, the election threshold is a factor affect-
ing the implementation of material equality of votes. When the size of electoral 
districts is determined before the election, the election threshold does not modify 
the voting power regardless of whether it is referred to all the citizens or only to 
the part who have full political rights8. This conclusion is an effect of differentia-
tion between the material aspect of equality and the equality of electoral opportu-
nities. In the second case, the effect of election threshold is unquestionable.
Still, the above-mentioned distinction should not obscure the fact that 
the impact of the election threshold on the implementation (or not) of the 
8 In this situation, we could only speak about the modifying impact of the election threshold 
on the material equality of elections if the voting powers were computed merely considering 
persons who actually exercise their active voting right. It should be remembered, though, 
that the elected person represents all the citizens (voters), also those who did not decide to 
participate in the voting. 
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equality of electoral opportunities in the case of European Parliament elections 
may modify the material aspect of equality of elections. Although the accuracy 
of this thesis is rather doubtless, it is impossible to measure the range of this ef-
fect precisely. On the one hand, it would require the knowledge on the decision-
Members of the European Parliament, and on the other hand it would be nec-
essary to conduct a study among the voters, concerning: 1) the determinants of 
their political choice during the said election, 2) the motivations for resigning 
from participation in voting.
Analysing this issue from the perspective of collective, secondary sub-
jects of politics, we need to note that the election threshold may be an element 
decisive for their failure to participate in the electoral competition. It espe-
cially refers to regional parties, which without the election threshold or the 
threshold at the electoral district level would have a real chance to obtain seats. 
Increasing the number of subjects taking part in election competition, in turn, 
-
bution. Thus it would indirectly affect the size of electoral districts.
number of subjects taking part in competition for seats and lack of institutional 
barriers to limit the equality of electoral opportunities (such as small elector-
al districts or the election threshold) lower the probability of tactical voting. 
And when realizing the fact that a party the voter supports for ideological and 
policy reasons will have a problem with accomplishing the election threshold 
level, the voter may vote for a candidate of another election committee which 
representing similar policies. It cannot be excluded either that some of the vot-
ers, aware of the institutional barriers incorporated in the electoral system and/
competing for seats will resign from the participation in the election.
The scale of voting behaviours described here, in the context of the 
European Parliament election of 2014, is not known. Still, the awareness of the 
existing conditions allows to see an indirect impact of the election threshold on 
shaping the size of electoral districts. As a result, it turns out that the strength 
of its impact on the implementation of the material aspect of election equality 
have to refer to a hypothetical situation. This, however, is always connected 
with high risk. Therefore, because of a lack of objective instruments to measure 
dimension. 
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Studying the material aspect of equality of European Parliament elec-
tions should also involve the question of the electoral formula, i.e. the way of 
transforming votes into seats. The multiplicity of methods existing in this regard 
methods which in certain conditions reveal their discriminative character.
Generally, we should conclude that the electoral formula is the element 
the implementation of the material aspect of equality or its impact is negligi-
ble. It is so because if we measure the voting power referring it to the number 
of citizens (residents, persons with the right to vote), not persons actually tak-
ing part in the elections, then the way of transformation of the votes into seats 
can only be evaluated from the perspective of implementation of the equality 
of electoral opportunities. Only the placing of the electoral formula in a broader 
perspective (taking into consideration the size of electoral districts and the elec-
grow. In the context of the electoral system existing at the European Parliament 
election in Poland, the importance of the electoral formula is undoubted due to 
number of seats is assigned to each district even before the election, the election 
threshold cannot directly affect the voting power in any direct way. If, howev-
er, the size of electoral districts is connected with the outcome of the election, 
the choice of the electoral formula is very important.
 The above-mentioned two-step mechanism of seat distribution in the 
European Parliament elections in Poland results in applying two methods of 
-
uted among the election committees which accomplished the election threshold 
the greatest support among all the divisor methods. The result is a derivative of 
the fact that between particular divisors shaping the successive electoral quo-
tients there is a small, unitary difference (1, 2, 3,… 51). And the smaller the dif-
ference, the higher value the successive electoral quotients have. Especially in 
the situation when the difference between the election outcome of the strongest 
-
Parliament elections, it must be noted that the ultimate effect of seat distribu-
tion at the national level may lead to a change of their distribution among dis-
tricts. The results of the 2014 election proved that the power of the method of 
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of no election threshold. This is illustrated by the data presented in Table 4. 
Hare-Niemeyer methods (mathematical proportion system) shows how obvi-
ous is the impact of electoral formulas on the ultimate distribution of seats.
After allocating seats to particular election committees at the national 
level, they are distributed among their district lists on the basis of the Hare-
Niemeyer method. This second level of repartition of seats translates directly 
into the size of electoral districts, which has already been described. Here we 
need to highlight that the Hare-Niemeyer method promotes more faithful re-
received weaker support. This method does not protect such districts from a 
complete lack of seats, but the result of the district list is decisive in this respect. 
Conclusions
This study concentrated on the implementation of material equality of 
European Parliament elections in Poland. Three elements of the electoral sys-
tem were analysed: 1) the size of electoral districts, 2) the election threshold, 
and 3) the electoral formula. It turns out that none of them is clearly decisive for 
the assessment of implementation of the discussed principle. Still, undoubtedly 
the key issue is the size of electoral districts, essentially affected by the distribu-
tion of support among the district lists of election committees that obtain seats. 
An important determinant, though not necessarily of key importance, is the in-
ter-district election turnout. But both the election threshold and the electoral 
formula have a modifying impact on the size of electoral districts. This analy-
sis also showed that apart from the formal rules determining the framework of 
-
ter of the party system, the level of institutionalization of political parties, the 
strategies used by the subjects participating in the elections and the fact that 
a role, especially the issues connected with their political choices.
On the basis of the European Parliament election in Poland of 25th May 
2014, it may be said that in contrast to the statutory declaration, the election 
violates the material aspect of equality. The deviation from the ideal point is 
not very high, although it exceeds the parameters indicated in “Code of Good 
Practice in Electoral Matters”. But if the legislator decided to adopt the prin-
ciple of election equality for implementation, they should consistently aim this. 
At the level of the electoral system it would be possible to adopt rules which 
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-
tion of seats within the framework of one (national) electoral district. Taking 
into account the functions of the European Parliament in the institutional space 
of the EU and considering the way of participation of national political parties 
-
tion threshold in this election.
The proposals presented above are only an opinion in the discussion. 
Presenting them, one needs to be aware that a change in the electoral rules is the 
and those who feel harmed by them. Besides, a change of the formal frame of 
electoral competition may modify the behaviours of potential participants of the 
election game. This way a complex network of relations appears, showing the 
multiplicity of interests connected with the competition for the seats of MEPs.
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Number of citizens 
(in millions)
Seats
Deviations from the European 
norm of representation 
Malta 0.4 6 10.059
Luxembourg 0.5 6 8.047
Cyprus 0.8 6 5.029
Estonia 1.3 6 3.095
Slovenia 2 8 2.682
Latvia 2.3 8 2.332
Lithuania 3.3 11 2.235
Croatia 4.4 11 1.676
5.3 13 1.645
Ireland 4.5 11 1.639
Slovakia 5.4 13 1.614
Denmark 5.5 13 1.585
Bulgaria 7.6 17 1.500
Sweden 9.2 20 1.458
Austria 8.3 18 1.454
Hungary 10 21 1.408
Czech Republic. 10.5 21 1.341
Portugal 10.6 21 1.328
Belgium 10.7 21 1.316
Greece 11.2 21 1.257
Netherlands 16.4 26 1.063
UE 503.6 751 1
Romania 21.5 32 0.998
Poland 38.1 51 0.898
Italy 60 73 0.816
Great Britain 61.7 73 0.793
Spain 45.8 54 0.791
Germany 82 96 0.785
64.3 74 0.772
Own study based on demographic information available from: [
...].
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